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Religion and Entrepreneurship:
a match made in heaven?
There is a very old question in social science about whether religion is favora-
ble or antithetical to economic activity. There have of course been ascetic cur-
rents within all of the world’s major religions. Right up to the present day,
denunciations of the commercial spirit, and more generally of the excesses associ-
ated with economic development, can be heard from within virtually all religious
traditions. Conversely, there have been prosperous adherents of all the major
religions who have argued fervently that their religion was an essential ingredient
in their economic success. However, the interesting question is not whether reli-
gion can be used to support either a favorable or an unfavorable attitude to
economic activity – of course it can do either. It is whether there is something
intrinsic either to the religious attitude, or to the cultural presuppositions embed-
ded in some or all of the major religious traditions, which tends on average to
favor or to discourage the attitudes appropriate to economic activity. These are
attitudes such as saving and investment, desire for consumption of material
goods and services, and esteem for those who have achieved material success.
Max Weber’s argument that Calvinist Protestantism had induced its adher-
ents to focus on the performance of religious works as a sign of divine election
remains a classic and influential example of the claim that religion may encour-
age economic development (Weber, 1905). Weber’s argument now looks much
less convincing than it once did: Becker & Woessmann (2009) have provided
strong geographical evidence that the influence of protestantism on economic
growth operated mainly through the incentives it created for investments in
human capital, since literate individuals could read the Bible once it had been
translated from Latin (a similar argument is made for China in the 1920s by
Chen et al., 2014). But in any case the link was never simple, even in Weber’s
writings. Weber himself also believed that a parallel set of rational, systematizing
and bureaucratic attitudes encouraged by modern economic activity would grad-
ually displace the religious mind-set in the long run. So religion might have been
necessary to give an initial impetus to economic growth, but economic develop-
ment would eventually outgrow its religious origins.
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It is only in recent years that scholars trained in economics have begun to
pay attention to this fascinating and increasingly important question using the
tools of modern statistics and benefiting from the availability of systematic large-
scale data. This is not because an interest in religion is foreign to the history of
economic thought. Many economists in the 18th century and before had been
extremely interested in religion. However, for a variety of reasons, religion more
or less dropped off the map of economists in the 19th and 20th centuries. For
instance, the subject is not mentioned except very indirectly in Marshall’s Principles
of Economic (1890). Instead, religion became the exclusive domain of sociologists
(such as Weber and Émile Durkheim), anthropologists (such as James Frazer) and
historians (such R. H. Tawney)1. Even when these scholars discussed the eco-
nomic impact of religious belief and practice they rarely aroused the interest of
scholars working within the discipline of economics.
Though these authors differed in many ways, they broadly agreed on a “secu-
larization” hypothesis: religion represented a mid-point between primitive magic
and modern science, and was destined to disappear as societies modernized. And
for a long time in the 20th century the decline of religion in European societies
seemed to bear out the secularization hypothesis. The United States apparently
constituted an exception, though many proponents of secularization argued that
this exception applied only to the second half of the twentieth century and consti-
tuted a local and no doubt temporary reversal of an overall secularizing trend.
That hypothesis now seems clearly mistaken, both in the sense that seculari-
zation does not appear to be the general consequence of modernization and
prosperity in the world as a whole, and in the sense that the United States has
never really conformed to the secularization hypothesis at any period in its his-
tory. Roger Finke and Rodney Stark, in an influential book called The Churching
of America, showed that religious belief and practice have been growing in
importance more or less continuously in the United States since the founding of
the republic (Finke & Stark, 2005). And the United States seems less of an
exception than it once did, as shown by the experience of other major countries
where religion has been growing in importance along with economic develop-
ment more generally – Brazil being one clear example2.
Economists have increasingly begun studying two main roles for religion in
the modern world (distinct, that is, from whatever direct spiritual benefits it may
provide for its adherents):
– To create and reinforce social trust;
– To be a vehicle of identity for people in face of the disruptions due to economic
growth.
1. Weber (1905); Durkheim (1912); Frazer (1890); Tawney (1926).
2. See “Religion defies recession in Brazil”, Financial Times, 25 June 2015.
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These two rôles are not entirely distinct: a vehicle of identity may also rein-
force social trust, because individuals may be more trusting or more trustworthy
towards those who share their identity (the empirical evidence on this is some-
what mixed).
Trust is an essential ingredient of social interaction at all levels of moderniza-
tion (see Norenzayan, 2013), and in principle religion can play a part in creating
social trust in many kinds of context, in rich societies as well as in poor ones.
There is some evidence of secularization in certain countries characterized by
high levels of generalized trust and a developed welfare state (such as Sweden);
in such contexts one might speak of religion’s being a substitute for other trust-
creating institutions. But it is increasingly recognized that these countries are
rather unusual in the modern world, and that there is no reason to expect other
poor and middle-income countries to follow their example. Evidence from
China, where there has been rapid growth in the number of adherents to both
Buddhism and Christianity in recent years at a period of very high economic
growth, also reinforces the view that religion and economic development may
very much go hand in hand (Vermander, 2009; Seabright, Wang & Zhou, 2016).
It may also be that religious belief and practice, when it does not reinforce
economic growth directly, may satisfy needs that are felt more keenly when
economic growth is strong (some suggestive evidence for this is presented in
Campante & Yanagaziwa-Drott, 2015).
The main channels of influence by which religious belief and practice influence
economic outcomes, and that have been studied in this growing comparative litera-
ture, are as follows (see Norenzayan et al., 2015, for a recent overview). There is
historical and ethnographic evidence of the association of religion with attitudes
conducive to economic growth and development (Guiso et al., 2003; Barro &
McCleary, 2003; McCleary & Barro, 2006; Putnam & Campbell, 2010; Chen
et al., 2014), with pro-social behavior more generally (Henrich et al., 2010;
Ahmed, 2009), and with the evolution of social and political complexity (Watts
et al., 2015). However, this evidence varies by religion and by the type of behav-
ior considered (Benjamin et al., 2010). It is also far from clear what might be
the causal mechanisms involved – whether religion favors the development of
the appropriate attitudes, or whether the independent presence of these attitudes
predisposes people to accept the teachings of various religions.
The literature also reports evidence of the role of religion in building social
and economic trust, either by inducing more trustworthy behavior (Norenzayan,
2014; Randolph-Seng & Nielsen, 2007) or by enabling adherents to signal trust-
worthiness to others (Iannacone, 1994; Irons, 2001; Bulbulia, 2009; Auriol et al.,
2016). It may facilitate the cultural transmission of behavioral practices by
enhancing the credibility of the utterances of cultural role models in the eyes of
those who copy their behavior (Henrich, 2009). I consider these mechanisms in
more detail below.
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Overall, therefore, there is a growing consensus that religion need not be
antithetical to economic development but may even favor it, and also that it
does so by contribution to the creation and reinforcement of social trust. But
how, exactly, is this contribution to social trust supposed to work?
Trust in the company of strangers
The puzzle of large-scale human cooperation
Adam Smith famously wrote that human beings had a natural propensity to
“truck, barter and exchange” that was the foundation of large-scale social
cooperation, and other eighteenth century economists and philosophers pointed
to parallels with the complex societies of the social insects such as the ants and
the bees. In fact, thanks to modern biology we know that human social coopera-
tion is a radical exception to the kind of cooperation found elsewhere in nature,
which occurs overwhelmingly among close relatives. Human societies are unique
in that we cooperate on a massive scale, not only with non-relatives but also
with complete strangers. Prehistoric human societies only rarely saw encounters
between strangers and many of these were extremely violent. Trusting complete
strangers enough to trade with them was frequently a suicidal thing to do – and
this was only a short while ago in evolutionary terms, long after our brains and
bodies evolved into something very close to their modern forms. How have such
encounters now become so common a feature of daily life that we no longer
think of them as in the slightest way problematic?
The answer (as I summarize and develop in Seabright, 2010) consists in a
subtle mix of our evolved psychology (both cognitive and emotional) and our
modern institutions. Although our prehistoric environment offered relatively few
opportunities for interaction with strangers3, the psychology that evolved in this
environment has created predispositions for us to trust other unknown individuals
and to behave in a trustworthy way towards them, under the right circumstances.
Furthermore, our institutions reinforce our cooperative predispositions so that
a little cooperative psychology goes a long way. Modern social psychology and
behavioural economics have extensively documented that the austere egoism of
traditional homo economicus is a very poor description of how real human
beings think, feel and behave. This is fortunate, because a purely rational egoist
approach to human interaction would be incapable of founding cooperation as
we know it.
These facts were already well known to Adam Smith, professor of moral
philosophy and author not only of The Wealth of Nations but also of The Theory
3. There is still considerable uncertainty about how rare such encounters were at different
stages of prehistory – see Seabright (2012).
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of Moral Sentiments. Smith understood that human beings have values and emo-
tions as well as wants and beliefs, and these values and emotions are just as
central to our economic life a our capacity to reason. However, as Smith’s work
preceded Darwin’s by nearly a century he did not ask the questions that would
naturally occur to us about how this is possible. The work of modern biologists
and social scientists has now helped us to understand better how natural selec-
tion made us that way. As Bowles and Gintis put it in their book A Cooperative
Species, the challenge for science in explaining human cooperation with strangers
on a vastly greater scale than in other species is “not that typically addressed
by biologists and economists, namely to explain why people cooperate despite
being selfish. [it is]..to explain why we are not purely selfish – why the social
preferences that sustain cooperation are so common” (2013, p. 3). Though there
is still disagreement in the literature about this, it seems likely that the answer
involves three mechanisms. The first is multi-level selection: groups composed
of altruists willing to sacrifice themselves for the rest of the group would have
out-competed groups composed of selfish individuals (particularly in the group
warfare that was common in prehistory), even if egoists had out-competed altru-
ists within groups. The second mechanism is sexual selection: cooperative indi-
viduals might have made more attractive partners than selfish ones. The third
mechanism is mimicry by strangers of the behavior that tends to distinguish
friends4. Together these make it much more comprehensible how the rich array
of values, emotions and pro-social preferences that distinguish real human beings
might have been favored by natural selection in the conditions of prehistory.
Still, explaining how human beings have come to have values and emotions is
a long way from explaining how they have come to have religion. Many religions
in fact hold a privileged place among the institutions that transmit and reinforce
our values and emotions, but they are not the only institutions to do this, and
they do not just do this. They also (at least most of them) also speak to us about
invisible spirits they claim to occupy our world, spirits who are like us in many
ways, but also not like us in being free of many of material constraints of our
daily lives. These are typically spirits who can influence our lives for better or
for worse, with whom we are well advised to communicate, and whom we often
seek to placate. Belief in the existence of such spirits – I shall call this phenome-
non “enchantment” in the remainder of this article – runs radically counter not
only to the ordinary evidence of the senses, but also to the conclusions of modern
science. This observation raises two questions: first, how have so many human
beings come to accept such beliefs, and secondly, what connection do such beliefs
have to social trust?
The first question is particularly challenging, and explanations for the evolu-
tion of values and emotions via natural selection are not sufficient to explain
4. See Centorrino et al. (2015) for one such form of mimicry.
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the evolution of religion. Although a great many of the values and emotions that
distinguish our behavior from the egoism of Homo economics appear to have
analogues in other primate species, human beings are the only species in nature
as far as we can tell who hold widespread beliefs about the existence of invisible
spirits with whom we interact. We are also the only species to have developed
a sophisticated scientific world-view in which such spirits seem to have no place.
How could these two developments co-occur?
Where not to look for an explanation
It is not enough to argue (like, for example, Lightman, 2015), that science
does not cater adequately for our quest for meaning and thereby leaves a gap
for religion to fill. This may be true, but even so it does not constitute an explana-
tion of the kind required, for it still needs to be explained why human beings
should have evolved to have a need for meaning. Similarly, it has been said that
human beings are afraid of death5, and so we comfort ourselves with the notion
that life goes on in the spirit world. This is not always true – not all religions
claim that individuals will join the spirit world when they die. But even when
it is true, as it often is, it leaves the central mystery unexplained. All animals are
afraid of death in the simple sense that they flee predators, but only human
beings appear to brood on the fact that death will always catch up with them
in the end. How can it have helped us thrive on the African woodland savanna
to develop such a melancholy temperament? And once we suffered such an afflic-
tion, how can it have helped us to seek comfort in beliefs about invisible spirits?
The theory of natural selection has difficulty accounting for the evolution of pla-
cebo remedies for any self-inflicted ailments, whether physical or psychological.
Human beings, like all mammals, have developed sense organs of extraordi-
nary sophistication that can detect the presence of predators and prey in the
environment around them. So it is all the more puzzling that many human beings,
uniquely in the animal kingdom, credit to the world around them the existence
of invisible spirits, who are like us in having perceptions and intentions, while
being free of some of our physical constraints, and whom we are well advised
to charm and placate even at considerable material cost to ourselves. Perceiving
creatures where none exist is hardly as dangerous as failing to perceive creatures
that do exist, but it is still a surprising waste of energy and resources for animals
on the margins of survival. Trusting only the evidence of their immediate senses
and refusing to multiply ontologies is not just an application of the principle of
Occam’s razor, but is clearly the most adaptive strategy for almost all animals
in almost all circumstances. The only exceptions are where they follow the sig-
nals of other individuals about the presence of food or predators – like the honey-
bees that set out for nectar after observing the dance of returning workers, or
the chimpanzees that follow the hunting-calls of other members of their troop.
5. The classic statement of this point of view is Becker (1973).
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And even in such cases, these signals of their fellows do not demand great
sacrifices – they allow individuals to coordinate their efforts, rather than sacri-
ficing other more immediate food sources in favour of a distant and invisible
alternative.
One theory that has received widespread support among researchers is the
idea that enchantment involved an optimal trade-off among type-1 and type-2
perceptual errors in the prehistoric human environment. This is sometimes
known as the “seeing faces in the clouds” theory, and asserts that natural selec-
tion produces a tendency to err in the direction of seeing too much evidence of
intention in nature (it’s less dangerous to see predators when none exist, than
to see none when they do exist)6. It is certainly true that such phenomena (which
even have their own scientific name – pareidolia – and an associated Wikipedia
page) can be claimed as inspiration by various religious traditions. However,
like a number of other “meme” theories which imply that religious ideas have
evolved by imitation, in brains that were not specifically adapted to host them,
the “faces in the clouds” theory has a major gap: it doesn’t explain why the
perception of enchantment survives reflective criticism. We don’t think that faces
in the clouds are real faces – once we start to reflect on what we see, we quickly
and easily correct the errors in our first impressions. But believers think spirits
are real beings, and the belief that they are seems to be reinforced, not under-
mined, by introspection, reflection and discussion. This suggests we need to see
the processes of introspection, reflection and discussion as an intrinsic part of
how religions develop, not as a hostile environment which ought to extinguish
our religious sympathies but to which many religions remain unaccountably
immune.
Indeed, introspection and reflection are the key to human beings’ capacity
to cooperate by representing future rewards and dangers to themselves and to
others. This suggests that an answer to our puzzle may lie in the basic trust
mechanisms that have helped humans build complex societies. In particular,
those trust mechanisms, once established, also encourage the tendency to believe
in, or at least to suspend judgment about the initial implausibility of, absent or
invisible beings and the promises they make. The notions of trustworthiness,
honour and credibility help us to decide with whom we can afford to cooperate.
Enchantment as an adaptive, pro-cooperative feature
of our prehistoric brains
In Seabright (2017) I develop the hypothesis that the explosive growth in
our brains during our evolution from the apes did more than just give us the
capacity to solve increasingly complex social and environmental problems. It
6. This theory is central to Boyer (2001) but was earlier developed by Guthrie (1993).
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also turned our brains into a marketplace for competing ideas about ourselves
and our place in the world. In that marketplace, just as in the real marketplace
where human beings had begun to develop complex systems of trade and cooper-
ation, the key to success lay in the creative suspension of disbelief about the
everyday evidence of our senses. What sets human beings apart from other ani-
mals is that we have established elaborate networks of cooperation with other
individuals, many or most of whom are genetically unrelated to us. This has
required the ability to override the evidence of our immediate senses on a daily
basis in the interests of distant and invisible objectives. We have to work out
when we can afford to trust someone who has no intrinsic reason to help us,
and who offers us nothing we can immediately use.
It is worth emphasizing that this capacity is much more sophisticated than
just the ability to exchange items of value. Monkeys and apes trade with each
other on the basis of immediate advantages – but human beings are prepared to
exchange on the basis of promises of future rewards they cannot see, taste or
touch. This ability to suspend ordinary disbelief – in a structured rather than a
purely whimsical fashion – is what enabled Homo sapiens sapiens to survive in
the harsh conditions of the Upper Palaeolithic, spreading out from Africa to
colonize a range of habitats quite different from those in which he first evolved.
It then enabled him to adopt agriculture, settled in towns and cities, and found
large and complex civilizations. It also meant he would be forever solicited by
entrepreneurs with projects, secular or spiritual, that appeal to rewards beyond
the perceptible horizon. This ability to override ordinary sensual evidence is an
intrinsic function of the healthy human brain, but it is also one that other human
beings have learned to influence and manipulate, for good ends and bad.
This answer to the first question (“how did human beings come to believe
in the existence of invisible spirits?”) also provides the ingredients for an answer
to the second (“how did this contribute to social trust?”), since social trust
involves a very similar process of suspending disbelief in the evidence of the
senses. The point about a facility for suspending disbelief is that it cannot be
calibrated in advance to ensure it operates only in instances that deserve it. It
will operate in response to cues, cues that can in principle be imitated and manip-
ulated by others. Thus a willing suspender of disbelief will be both a readier
collaborator in various economic projects, and a more frequent subscriber to
extravagant cosmologies, if there are others around to propose them. A skeptic
who wields Occam’s razor at every opportunity will rarely trust anybody, since
the hypothesis that the world is full of thieves and charlatans is so much simpler
and more elegant than the alternative that someone who has nothing to show
you may nevertheless be someone you should trust.
Many details remain to be sketched out in this account of how human beings,
the most sophisticated thinkers in the natural world, came to people their uni-
verse with so many invisible spirits, as part of the same process that led them
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to become more trusting of others. I focus below on three questions that would
naturally occur to many readers on the basis of the argument so far. First, is
an evolutionary explanation really necessary at all? Secondly, what kinds of
psychological mechanisms might have been involved in the process? Thirdly,
why did the evolution of a greater willingness to suspend disbelief not automati-
cally lead to exploitation by others?
The necessity of an evolutionary explanation
So why is an evolutionary explanation necessary? Why should a sense of
enchantment be adaptive at all for human beings? Perhaps it is one of those
features of our social lives that just have no adaptive consequences, like the rules
of baseball or the fact that most countries drive on the right instead of the left,
or the fact that you can make somebody’s leg jerk upwards by tapping their
knee lightly with a hammer. On reflection, however, this suggestion won’t do:
unlike the rules of baseball or the rule of the road or the knee-jerk reflex, our
sense of enchantment costs us a lot. Individually and collectively, we spend real
resources satisfying our hunger for enchantment; we listen to guidance from the
spirit world, and we are prepared to sacrifice and sometimes to die in response
to its commands. If such devotion were merely a matter of throwing scarce
resources away for nothing in return, those among our ancestors who were
unfortunate enough to develop such a predilection would very probably have
been ruined by it, and in the harsh environment of the Palaeolithic would have
failed to leave descendants, let alone to spread their predilection among all the
societies of the modern world. Enchantment must have had some kind of adapt-
ive benefit, if only because its adaptive costs are so obvious and so large.
The psychological mechanisms
What kinds of psychological mechanisms might have been responsible for
our willingness to suspend disbelief? Our sense of enchantment bears a family
resemblance to two other psychological capacities that have come a long way
in the human species from their rudimentary equivalents in other apes. The first
is language. Language allows us to refer to absent objects and people, to past
and future events, and thereby to conceive shared hopes and fears, including the
very human preoccupation with our own future death. At first sight the world’s
languages look so diverse that there is nothing they could possibly be said to
have in common. But the work of Noam Chomsky, confirmed by a great detail
of subsequent research7, has shown beyond reasonable doubt that existing lan-
guages share many structural features, and that the ability to understand and
use this features is hard-wired into the human brain. Varied as they are, human
7. Pinker (1994) summarizes this research.
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languages are nothing like as varied as they logically could be. Though questions
of language origin remain controversial8, it makes sense to suppose that the brain
contains something like a “language module” – which evolved because it spectac-
ularly enhanced our ancestors’ capacity for social coordination, enabling them
to hunt better, forage better, and defend themselves more effectively. It would
have evolved in spite of its significant costs – the costs of the protein to build
and the energy to maintain a much larger brain, and the dangers of choking
caused by the repositioning of the larynx that equipped us to articulate the
sounds of a complex language.
Our sense of enchantment has something in common with our capacity for
language, though the differences are as instructive as the similarities. The world’s
systems of religious belief look at first sight much too diverse to have anything
important in common. But some anthropologists, notably Pascal Boyer (2001)
and Scott Atran (2002), have brought together the ethnographic evidence from
hundreds of earlier studies, as well as from their own fieldwork, to show that
systems of religious belief have a structure. They are supernatural but not ran-
domly or extravagantly so – they depart from everyday common sense in predict-
able directions and to a limited extent. For instance, spirits may be invisible but
they have a continuous existence in time – they may transform themselves from
one shape into another but they do not stop existing in between. Spirits may
know things about human social interactions that are hidden from others, but
they are not literally omniscient. Their knowledge is of social information – unlike
us, they know the full plot of the soap opera. Spirits may be able to see through
walls but normally not through women’s clothes, except when medically neces-
sary. They may answer people’s prayers but only after the prayers have been
uttered – they do not act in anticipation of prayers that will be uttered in the
future. They do not undertake difficult but pointless miracles, such as making
rivers flow upstream. And so on. In short, beliefs about spirits have a structure.
This structure is built on the assumption that spirits are intentional agents just
as we are, except that they are freed from a limited number of our physical
constraints. Not all implausible beliefs could ever make sense as components of
a religious creed.
This evidence of “deep structure” suggests that religious beliefs take the shape
they do in part because human brains have a certain structure. So learning more
about this structure may help us to understand how those brains evolved to be
that way. But this doesn’t mean that the brain structure we are seeking is like
the structure involved in language, let alone that human brains have evolved an
“enchantment module” just as they evolved a language module. For one thing,
all human beings except those who are brain damaged or traumatised can use
8. See Ian Tattersall’s review in the New York Review of Books, August 18th 2016, of
Berwick & Chomsky (2016).
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language. But not all human beings perceive spirits in the world around them,
and many people can live and function quite happily with no sense of the super-
natural at all. People are also very different in how they respond to the enchanted
world – for some it is an immediate sensation, for others a vague background
presence; for some it can induce trances and violent episodes of possession, while
the behaviour of others barely changes at all. Religious sensibility appears at
very different ages in different people. Unlike language, which uses certain dedi-
cated areas of the brain (notably Broca’s area), the perception of enchantment
appears to draw on elements across the range of “normal” brain functions. The
sense of enchantment emerges from the coordination of a number of psychologi-
cal capacities that almost certainly evolved to perform quite different functions.
Religion, like the fear of death that it so often accompanies and to which it
ministers, seems to have hitched a ride on the very secular evolutionary journey
of the human brain.
Robustness against exploitation
Finally, why did the greater trustingness implied by human beings’ sophisti-
cated capacity for suspending disbelief not automatically lead to exploitation by
others, and therefore to more trusting individuals being selected against in favor
of less trusting ones? The literature has explored in considerable detail two main
mechanisms by which such exploitation could have been avoided, both based on
the idea that religious belief and practice have come to be associated, on average,
with greater trustworthiness as well as with greater willingness to trust at least
some others. This greater trustworthiness on the part of the religious would lead,
on average, to their associating in turn with more trustworthy individuals, and
therefore to higher levels of cooperation experienced by the religious even if they
still tended to be exploited in their interactions with the irreligious. The two
mechanisms are monitoring, whereby religious belief and practice change the
behavior of the individuals concerned so that they become more trustworthy,
and selection, whereby individuals who are intrinsically more trustworthy tend
to be attracted by religious belief and practice, even if that practice does nothing
to modify their behavior.
It’s important to emphasize that these mechanisms are in principle quite dis-
tinct even though much of the existing evidence of the association of religious
behavior with trustworthiness does not make it possible to distinguish between
the two. There is rather little evidence as to what extent religious membership
primarily signals the reliable character of adherents, as opposed to a reliable
situation in which to interact with adherents. In addition, there is little evidence
as to whom such a signal is primarily addressed – is it mainly to fellow adherents
or mainly to the general population?
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The emerging consensus among evolutionary anthropologists of religion
(Norenzayan, 2013; Norenzayan et al., 2015) leans towards the former, moni-
toring view, claiming specifically that religious belief and practice can help to
build social trust because:
1) Adherence to religions with “Big Gods” who observe human behavior
and punish norm-violation is associated with more pro-social behavior on the
part of adherents than of non-adherents;
2) The causal explanation for this statistical association is that adherence
works primarily by changing the behavior of adherents and not by signaling
their more reliable intrinsic character. This causal effect is demonstrated via
“priming” studies where subjects behave more pro-socially in the presence of a
prime such as a religious text or image from the denomination to which they
adhere (Norenzayan, 2014; Randolph-Seng & Nielsen, 2007). However, sorting
by preference may also occur (Aimone et al., 2013).
3) Their behavior becomes more cooperative towards co-religionists and
may or may not become more hostile towards outsiders – adherence is a club good
(Berman & Laitin, 2008; Choi & Bowles, 2007);
4) Costly religious group membership distinguishes genuine adherence from
cheap talk.
The claim that individuals who believe in invisible spirits will fear the conse-
quences of cheating others, and will thus become more trustworthy at the same
time as they become more trusting, is clearly descriptive of some, or even of
many religious traditions. And the idea that religion involves beliefs as well as
preferences (theology as well as ethics), makes sense from both a historical and
an evolutionary perspective. Many believers really do believe in the existence of
spirits that intervene in the world, and adjust their behavior accordingly in ways
that would not make sense if religious affiliation were just about having more
pro-social behavior (see Auriol et al., 2016). Nevertheless, this claim exaggerates
the extent to which all religions involve the policing of cooperative behavior.
Some (including many pentecostalist churches that preach the “prosperity gospel”)
can say much less about sin than they do about the promise of miracles (see
Gifford, 2004). And even if the claim were true it would not completely explain
why cynical free-riders – who were less trusting as well as less trustworthy – did
not drive out the co-operators in the population by cooperating only when
observed by human agents (I discuss this problem in greater detail in Seabright,
2017). It relies, in effect, on the impossibility of cynical free-riders’ being able
to hide their cynicism from the rest of the population.
There is also a growing body of evidence that many religions attract into
their membership individuals who would in any case be more pro-social even
without the influence of religion. Although difficult to test directly, this hypoth-
esis is broadly corroborated by studies that demonstrate, in certain contexts,
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degrees of pro-social behavior that vary with degrees of religious commitment
even in wholly secular contexts. For instance, Auriol et al. (2016) report an
experimental study in Haiti in which subjects who would later demonstrate a
consistent willingness to pay for religious images behaved in a more trustworthy
way than others who would not later demonstrate such willingness (even though
their trustworthiness was tested before religion was even mentioned to the
subjects).
The idea that religious commitment involves a degree of mutual sorting by
certain kinds of particularly pro-social individual is no less central to many reli-
gious traditions than is the idea that individuals become more trustworthy as a
result of their religious commitment. Indeed, the two may reinforce each other –
if you want to become more trustworthy and are afraid of not being able to
maintain such high standards, surrounding yourself with trustworthy people
may be a good way to reinforce your determination to do so. Still, it is clear that
different religious traditions emphasize these mechanisms to different degrees.
What does all this mean for the particular question whether religion contrib-
utes to entrepreneurship? What are religious entrepreneurs, and what do they
teach us about the place of religion in a rational modern economy characterized
by exchange among strangers?
Two approaches to religion and entrepreneurship
In principle there would seem to be two main ways in which religion and
entrepreneurship might be associated, in traditions that can be traced back
respectively to Adam Smith and to Max Weber. The first approach considers
religious leaders as entrepreneurs just like entrepreneurs in other fields, and con-
siders the business models of religious leaders in ways similar to those in which
the business models of secular entrepreneurs can be analyzed, while making due
allowance for the particular challenges of the services that religious leaders are
trying to market. The link between religion and secular entrepreneurship, on this
view, is one of analogy. In a remarkable passage in Smith’s Wealth of Nations,
Smith attributed the greater success of nonconformist churches in attracting
adherents in his own day (compared to the relative stagnation of the Church of
England) to the more effective incentive systems instituted by the former (Smith,
1776: book 5, chapter 1):
The [clergy] may either depend altogether for their subsistence upon the voluntary
contributions of their hearers; or they may derive it from some other fund to which
the law of their country may entitle them; such as a landed estate, a tythe or land
tax, an established salary or stipend. Their exertion, their zeal and industry, are likely
to be much greater in the former situation than in the latter. In this respect the teachers
of new religions have always had a considerable advantage in attacking those ancient
and established systems of which the clergy, reposing themselves upon their benefices,
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had neglected to keep up the fervour of faith and devotion in the great body of the
people; and having given themselves up to indolence, were become altogether incapa-
ble of making any vigorous exertion in defence even of their own establishment. The
clergy of an established and well-endowed religion frequently become men of learning
and elegance, who possess all the virtues of gentlemen, or which can recommend them
to the esteem of gentlemen; but they are apt gradually to lose the qualities, both good
and bad, which gave them authority and influence with the inferior ranks of people,
and which had perhaps been the original causes of the success and establishment of
their religion.
Two features of this passage are particularly worth noting. First, Smith attrib-
utes the different success of established and non-conformist religion not to any
difference in theology but purely to a difference in organization. Secondly, he is
absolutely non-judgmental about the reasons why worshippers might prefer one
religious approach rather than another – in just the same way as a management
consultant might not presume to judge why consumers have the tastes they do,
but comment simply on the different ways in which one firm differs from another
in its capacity to ascertain and respond to those tastes. For Smith, the non-
conformist churches have found a more winning formula because their managers
(priests and ministers) are more efficiently motivated to do so.
The second, broadly Weberian approach is to consider religious beliefs and
values as contributing to the way in which ordinary entrepreneurs carry out their
business, without their necessarily being anything specifically religious about the
goods or services they sell. In this view the link between religion and secular
entrepreneurship is one of complementarity rather than analogy. That entrepre-
neurs might be able to signal, through their (actual or claimed) religious convic-
tions, a greater trustworthiness to customers, business partners and others, has
been central to the research cited above on signaling, and there is now a substan-
tial body of evidence in favor of this channel of influence between religion and
economic development.
In principle these two approaches seem fairly distinct, but in practice the
distinction between them has been eroded from both directions. On the Weberian
side, there exist many firms that sell religious services as a part of a portfolio of
other goods and services, and on the Smithian side, churches and other religious
institutions often package other services alongside the more traditional activities
of prayer and celebratory worship. The former case includes firms that offer
charia-compliant or otherwise religiously-approved versions of ordinary goods
and services, while the latter has become a feature of some of the mega-churches
that operate in growing cities in many parts of the developed and developing world.
This is well illustrated by the following quotation attributed to the Reverend Jerry
Falwell, explaining the choice of his church to offer a large package of social
and leisure services to its worshippers:
Business is usually on the cutting edge of innovation and change because of its quest
for finances. Therefore the church would be wise to look at business for a prediction
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of future innovation. The greatest innovation in the last twenty years is the develop-
ment of the giant shopping centers. Here is the synergetic principle of placing at least
two or more services at one location to attract the customers. A combination of services
of two large customers with small supporting stores has been the secret of the success
of shopping centers (cited in Harding, 2000: 16).
Other evidence from the United States reinforces the idea that, where compe-
tition between religious organizations to attract members is reasonably vigorous,
the strategic considerations underlying the management of religious organiza-
tions has much in common with that of other businesses. For instance, Venkatesh
(2009) shows how many pastors on the south side of Chicago have a prior
history of undertaking business ventures in other, secular fields.
Outside the United States, the papers in this volume illustrate well the broad
spectrum of cases lying between the purely Smithian and the purely Weberian
types. At the Smithian and of the spectrum is the study by Bernard Sénécal on
the Venerable Chigwang, the founder of a highly successful Buddhist centre in
Seoul. Here we see a fascinating analysis of the factors that have made Chigwang
successful in a domain left open to innovation by the previous banishment of
Buddhist temples to the countryside. Sénécal points out the flexibility and adapt-
ability of Chigwang’s message – for instance his willingness to mix Buddhist and
Christian language to meet the expectations of an audience used to Christian
language – as well as his use of modern marketing methods such as websites
and audiovisual recordings. Chigwang has developed a business that happens to
sell religious services (and only religious services), and Sénécal analyzes its busi-
ness model in a perceptive and persuasive way.
In a similar vein the studies by Nathalie Luca and by Emmanuele Fantini
show how pentecostalism – often caricatured as offering a standard “prosperity
gospel” in places as different as Ghana and the United States – has in fact adapted
its message to the very different circumstances of Haiti and Ethiopia. In Haiti
the adaptation was made necessary by the desperate economic conditions of the
country, particularly after the 2010 earthquake, which would have undermined
the credibility of a simple prosperity gospel. In Ethiopia it was due more to the
particular ideology of the developmental state with which a simple free-markets
message would have been in some conflict. Both of these intriguing cases show
how flexibly pentecostalism has adapted to its market while still maintaining an
essentially religious focus.
The paper by Emir Mahieddin illustrates very well this adaptative capacity
of Pentecostalism, in this case to the more sober ethic (and aesthetic) of Swedish
protestantism. Here there is no question of a prosperity gospel in the simple
form in which it has flourished in parts of the United States and in sub-Saharan
Africa. People – at least those whom Mahieddin has interviewed – do not do
the Lord’s work in order to prosper in their own business affairs. Rather, they
conceive a continuity between their work in business and in other activities as
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a form of “producing God’s Capital” – one of Mahieddin’s subjects is a builder
who constructs both churches and centres for orphaned children, so it would
be hard to drive a wedge between his life as a businessman and his work as a
member of his church. Success in this context appears to be measured by the
coherence of the overall project with a vision of the duty of a committed Christian
in a fallen world, and certainly by nothing so simple as a purely financial crite-
rion of revenues or profits.
At the other, Weberian end of the spectrum is the study by Nicolas Lyon-Caen
on the way in which eighteenth century French merchants navigated the difficult
waters of the conflict between Jansenists and Jesuits. Here the issue is to what
extent a religious affiliation is important to those who are ordinary entrepreneurs
in secular society. In eighteenth century France this was a question of great
delicacy and even danger – given the bloody nature of religious conflicts one
might have expected merchants and traders to steer clear of religious affiliations
altogether, but although Lyon-Caen shows that many traders could change their
affiliations in quite opportunistic ways, some affiliation was usually better than
none, for reasons of trust among the communities with which they traded.
The three remaining studies in this volume show how difficult it is nevertheless
to maintain the separation between the Smithian and the Weberian perspectives.
The papers by Rémy Madinier on the growth of Islamic property development
in Indonesia and by Marie-Liesse De Luxembourg on Islamic finance document
classic instances of business that sell ordinary goods and services, but seek to
do so with a religious twist. In the case of property development, the twist is to
sell apartments that are in religious communities – complete with mosques and
restrictions on behavior by residents. As Madinier shows, such restrictions can
backfire if they are too strict since they may over-estimate the size of the market
for the most demanding behavioral restrictions. This is reminiscent of the work
of Iannacone (1994), which showed that strict lifestyles could be an important
selling point for a religious organization but that this would necessarily limit
the number of adepts it could reasonably hope to attract. De Luxembourg’s
work on Islamic finance makes a similar point – Islamic finance may have its
own economic rationale, but if the restrictions on the financial options available
are too tight, Islamic finance will only appeal to those who wish to adopt an
Islamic lifestyle considered as a whole and are prepared to pay the sometimes
considerable social costs.
Finally, Gwenaël Njoto-Feillard’s study of multi-level marketing, also in
Indonesia (which recalls Nathalie Luca’s own earlier work on multi-level market-
ing in Korea), shows just how difficult it is to know whether to categorize the
entrepreneurs concerned as religious or secular. In fact they are both – they sell
secular products by creating religious fervor, and religious products by creating
a very secular enthusiasm for business success. In a sense, therefore, this reminds
us that in a world where the desire for consumption and business success tap
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into a very real hunger for meaning and purpose on the part of populations
whose lives are undergoing transformations unimaginable to their parents and
grandparents, the secularization hypothesis, at least in its mainstream version,
has lost all plausibility. Religion – or something very like it whatever it happens
to be called – will continue to be a vivid presence in the world for the foreseeable
future.
In conclusion, comparing religion and entrepreneurship is a very natural
thing to do. Religious leadership is a form of entrepreneurship, and successful
entrepreneurship in many secular fields typically involves qualities that are very
important in religious communities – qualities such as passion, commitment,
and often a degree of unreasonable optimism that things will turn out well. Both
secular and religious entrepreneurship take a variety of different forms, and
exploring the links between them will be of great importance in understanding
the way in which religion will continue to shape the world in the 21st century.
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